






A new wave of modernization of the manufacturing system,  
a new role of the country in the global value chain:  









The government’s plan to stimulate domestic demand and boost economic growth provided 
China with tools to face the serious impact of the international crisis. The proactive fiscal 
measures and the easier monetary policy adopted by the government in 2009, however, 
risked weakening Wen Jiabao’s project to transform the current economic growth pattern 
which is excessively reliant on investment and exports of low price, low added-value goods. 
To support the goal of transforming China from a “large industrial country” to a “powerful 
industrial country”, the government has issued some plans for restructuring the 
manufacturing system and selecting some efficient players which would lead economic 
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In first few months of 2010, China analysts seemed unable to converge on a joint 
prediction about the recovery of China from the downturn which hit industrial output 
as well as exports  from autumn 2008 to spring 2009. Two opposing scenarios 
circulated through the various contexts concerned: in the first, China would race on 
alone towards a double-digit GDP increase. Revisiting their “decoupling” argument, 
which had been widely acclaimed prior to the subprime crisis, many analysts stressed 
the increasing gap between China and the developed countries as well as other 
emerging economies. Brazil, Russia and India, albeit to a different extent, appeared 
worn out by the deceleration in their growth rate. According to the authors of this 
optimist perspective, China was moving up a technology ladder,  gaining a new 
position in the global value chain as well. The so-called “two factors to protect”
1 
(liang bao 两 保), that is economic growth and the plan for upgrading the economic 
and social profile of the country
2
The other scenario had been designed upon a presumed inconsistency between the 
weak impact of the crisis on the GDP increase rate and the broad  scope of the 
stimulus plan. According to some analysts
, were going to be targeted. 
3, a massive stimulus plan of 586 billion 
US dollars suggested that the impact of the global crisis had been more serious than 
assumed by the official data. They supposed that the Chinese financial system had 
been hit by the transactions run by  some state owned enterprises (SOEs).
4
                                                 
11  Slogan coined by Wen Jiabao during the crisis. It summarizes the decision to introduce some 
expansive measures to contain the impact of the crisis on export-oriented industry without abandoning 
the earlier project for a more selective growth pattern 
  They 
forecasted that the export downturn would compel most of the manufacturing system 
to definitive relegation to low-price sectors. Finally, in their pessimism these analysts 
presumed that the policy for driving the domestic consumption propensity would be 
cooled by the fear of inflation.  
2 The plan for transforming the growth pattern has been the hallmark of the whole of Hu Jintao and 
Wen Jiabao’s term, see Siddivò, 2005 and 2006 
3 Lynch, D., 2009  
4  On  September 2009,  the  State  Asset  Supervision and Administration  Commission (SASAC) 
declared that SOEs reserve the right to walk away from “bad” contracts. China Economic Review, 
Sept. 2009 2 
 
Both the solitary leap toward the high value sectors and the economic collapse are 
two extreme hypotheses which are barely corroborated in the statistical data as well 
as Chinese economic analysis. Although the concerned statements of Wen Jiabao on 
the crisis have never left room for great optimism,
5
 
 specialists and officials were (and 
still are) focusing on macroeconomic issues, that is the industrial profile of the 
country, intersectoral changes as well as the relationship with the world 
manufacturing and distribution chains. 
A new development strategy 
 
The debate on the national policy for industrial upgrade is marked by a date: the year 
2020. According to government plans, within the next decade, China will transform 
itself from a “large industrial country” to a “powerful industrial country” (da bian 
qiang  大  变  强)
  6  like the United States, Japan and Germany
7.
  To pursue this 
ambitious goal, the Chinese government issued the “Medium  and Long-Term 
Development Plan for Renewable Energy in China” (2007-2020), the “Restructuring 
and Revitalizing Plan for Ten Industries”
8 (January-Spring 2009), and the “Decision 
to Create 62 Model Districts in the Innovative Industry Sectors” (July 2009).
9 All of 
them are linked to the “Medium/Long-term Plan for the Development of Science and 
Technology” (2006-2020) which is designed to support “endogenous innovation” 
(zizhu chuangxin 自主 创新)
10
The Plan for Renewable Energies attests that in order “to achieve China’s goals of 
establishing a resource-saving, environmentally friendly society and realizing 
sustainable development…we will speed up the development and deployment of 
 and transform China into a world leader in science 
and technology by 2020.  
                                                 
5  See the “Report of Government”, March 2010 and Naughton, B., (2010). More recently, Wen 
expressed his concern for the domestic situation (real estate rapid price increase) as well as the 
international economic trend. See Buckley, 2010  6 Actually the ultimate goal is to transform China in 2020 into a “comprehensive military, economic 
and cultural power”.    7 These are the countries cited most often in the Chinese literature on modernization and catching-up.  8www.gov.cn 2.04.2009  9 www.gov.cn, 2.2.2010  10 The stress on “endogenous innovation” has been perceived by analysts as a retreat from opening up 
to technology transfer. See AmCham. White Paper 2009 3 
 
hydropower, wind power, solar energy, and biomass energy.. [increasing] the share 
of renewable energy in China’s overall energy consumption mix” (15% of the total) 
by 2020 when “China will basically have achieved the ability to produce 
domestically the main renewable energy equipment it uses”.
11
The “restructuring and revitalizing” plans target the following sectors: iron and steel; 
automotive; textiles; machinery; consumption goods; shipbuilding; electronics; oil 
and chemistry; non-ferrous metals; logistics (which falls within the tertiary industry). 
According to the Chinese press, the terms “restructuring” and “revitalizing” do not 
mean the umpteenth state financial support for its enterprises  but an austere 
programme to eliminate excess capacity: cuts, M&A, technological renovation are 
the most commonly used terms to explain the government’s intentions. In the 
“Report on the Implementation of the 2009 Plan for National Economic and Social 
Development and on the 2010 Draft Plan”, Wen Jiabao cited the Guidelines on 
Curbing Excess Production Capacity and Redundant Development in Some 
Industries and Guiding Them toward Healthy Development: 
 
 “We put small-capacity thermal power generating units with  a total capacity of 
26.17 million kilowatts out of business last year, and reached the goal of eliminating 
small-capacity thermal power generating units with a total capacity of 50 million 
kilowatts within the Eleventh Five-Year Plan period (2006-2010) one and a half 
years ahead of schedule. In addition, we shut down backward production facilities in 
a number of industries, including steel mills with a total capacity of 16.91 million 
tons, iron foundries with a total capacity of 21.13 million tons, coalmines with a total 
capacity of 50 million tons, cement plants with a total capacity of 74.16 million tons, 
calcium carbide plants with a total capacity of 460,000 tons, ferrous alloy foundries 
with a total capacity of 1.62 million tons, coking works with a total capacity of 18.09 
million tons, paper mills with a total capacity of 500,000 tons and chemical fibre 




                                                 
11  National  Development and Economic Reform  Commission (NDRC), Medium and Long term 
Development Plan for Renewable Energy in China, (in Chinese), Aug. 2007, www. ndrc.gov.cn. 
Renewable energies already constitute one of the most successful industries in China: with more than 
400 companies;  it leads the world in photovoltaic production. Despite the high financial and 
ecological costs as well as the redundancy in production capacity, the alternative energies industry 
represents one of the hallmarks of the new industrial policy. 
  12 www.npc.gov.cn, 14 March 2009. On the restructuring policy for the steel industry see Naughton, 
2009 4 
 
While for the steel industry consolidation means an output reduction of 25,000 tons, 
for the electronic industry, for example, the goal is rural markets. To help enterprises 
achieve this purpose the government has set up a demand stimulus program among 
peasants. In the textile industry the plan established three goals: output reduction, 
technology and quality upgrading, and transition from OEM to OBM status in the 
supply chain. In the automotive sector, an increase in  output has been planned 
together with a necessary reduction in plants from 14 to 10.  
The plan for the creation of 62 model districts (shifan jidi 示范基地) was drawn up 
in July 2009 but the press revealed the outcome of the selection only in February 
2010 during the “National Conference of the MIIT on the Development of 
Innovative Sectors”. Twenty-five of the selected districts work in the mechanical 
sector, 15 in the processing industry, 8 in the consumption goods industry, and 14 in 
the electronics and information technology industry. The press revealed that 46.8 per 
cent of the districts are situated in the eastern provinces, 25.8 per cent in the central 
provinces and 27.4 per cent in the western ones. The leitmotifs of the whole 
document are: “spatial concentration, intensive use of soils, sector clustering”. 
Within the districts, according to the suggestions of Chinese economists, the so-
called “leader enterprise platforms” should be selected. The rationale is to identify 
and support a small number of highly efficient players
13
The present industrial policy is consistent with the call for a new role of the country 
in the global value chain:
. 
14    the recent Chinese economic literature abounds in 
rhetorical demands to change the “industrial system of our country (which) shows 
day by day its mediocrity in the global labour division”
15 as well as replace the 
current vertical value chains with horizontal ones. In January 2010, Zhao Jinping
16
"The prospect that China will overtake Germany to become top global exporter only 
means that China has indeed become a large trading country in terms of exporting 
scale, but in terms of the structure of exports, technological innovation and industry 
 
stated:  
                                                 
13 Barry Naughton assumes the new industrial policy is an attack on small private firms and, as a 
consequence, as a way of enhancing state ownership and control rights.  
  14 On the vertical value chain see Hong Liangying, 2009 and Wen Dongwei, 2009 
15  Liu Mingyu, 2009 
16 Central government department for development 5 
 
competitiveness, China is far from being eligible for the title of 'trade power'”, He 
adds that “China's exports had changed from labour-intensive products in the 1990s 
to current technology-intensive products, and electrical and electronic products as 
well as high-tech products have become a most important part of China's exports. 
But China's technology-intensive exports fell in the category of processing and 
assembling trade. About 83 percent of its high-tech exports and 75 percent of 




This might be considered a somewhat acid comment on the news, reported by the 
world press, about China overtaking Germany.  
These plans have been sustained by the results of many, in-depth analyses made by 
academics,  state officials and industry associations on the state of the  art of 
industrialization patterns in the country as well as on the challenges faced by the role 
as “world factory“ and increasing dependence on the processing trade. Although 
investigations have been carried out from different perspectives, most of the results 
focused the following aspects: overlapping structure, obsolescence of many firms, 
preference for reverse engineering rather than endogenous innovation and creation, 
scant investment in product quality and safety as well as the gap between the 
performance of large state-owned enterprises and that of small private enterprises. 
Indeed, according to many analysts SOEs have benefited from  state financial 
support, the monopolistic market structure which still characterizes China, 
technological and management knowledge accrued through agreements with 
multinational enterprises,  and  economies of scale. Finally,  they have been 
advantaged by foreign direct investment out flow which is ensuring a favourable 
supply of raw materials.  
By contrast, the private small medium enterprise has been buffeted by the collapse of 
international consumption: delayed payments, cancelled orders  and  denied credit 
have brought about a profound crisis in the large majority of export-oriented small 
firms. An essay on the industrial performance of some provinces summarizes the 
tones and contents of this debate
18
                                                 
17 Xinhua, 10.01.2010 
: comparing the performance of the manufacturing 
industry in Zhejiang, Guangdong, Jiangsu and Shandong during the first stage of the 
 
18 March 2009 6 
 
crisis, the authors found that the worst performance had been registered in Zhejiang 
province; the reasons lay in the manufacturing mix (textile and apparel) which for 
many years has  failed  to ensure  reasonable  terms of trade and has  led to the 
widespread presence of small and medium enterprises which do not invest in R&D, 
quality, safety and so on.  
The private SMEs are in fact reflecting upon the same issues. Two opposing 
strategies appear to be emerging from their recognition of the impact of the crisis: we 
refer to them as “Yiwu and CNTAC patterns”. Yiwu is the most famous “trade fair 
town” in China or maybe in the world. It introduces itself as “the paradise of foreign 
traders from all over the world”
19
CNTAC is the acronym for China National Textile and Apparel Council. In recent 
years, this important representative chamber has striven to impose an upgrade in the 
manufacturing chain, to help firms acquire  social and environmental codes 
(Corporate Social Responsibility),  and  to support SME access to credit for 
technological investment. In other words, it is trying to introduce a new growth 
pattern in the labour-intensive sector on the blueprint of state policy for the SOEs.   
 due to the dense concentration of markets which 
cover 320,000 items in 1,502 different categories. From the scant literature on Yiwu 
we found that the aim of local operators is to increase competitiveness by enhancing 
the integration between manufacturing firms and trade agencies (production on 
demand), reducing supply times, gaining big orders. Reducing costs in the labour-
intensive, low-cost industry seems to be their exit  strategy from the crisis. The 
symbolic target of their choice is the throwaway umbrella (about US$ 0.07).    
The discrepancy between public and private sectors  is, however, one of the 
perspectives utilized by analysts. Indeed, some prefer to investigate the 
modernization levels gained by the whole industrial system without assuming the 
ownership regime perspective. In 2009, Chen Jiagui and Huang Qunhui, for example, 
revealed that the level of modernization of the most important 15 industries in China 
had achieved 30-50 per cent of the level of the world’s most advanced economies. 
The two researchers of the China Academy of Social Sciences had utilized an 




evaluation indicator system built on the criteria of “OECD Science, Technology and 
Industry Outlook” and the relative scoreboard. In a range from 0 to 100, energy, high 
tech, medium high tech, medium low tech and low  tech industries achieved, 
respectively,  a score of 41.4; 40.8; 34.9; 48.5 and 41.7. They demonstrated that 
compared  with the modernization level of the most advanced economies, in 
particular the United States, Japan, France, Great Britain and Germany, their country 
was anything but an industrial power. The conclusion of their investigation was a call 
to resume the goals of modernization as well as technological upgrading. As we 
stated above, such critical investigations have led to many proposals on industrial 
restructuring. The large majority of them
20
- to select those industries which can facilitate the transition from a “large” to a 
“powerful” economy: many analysts have solicited the role of the state economic 
authorities in defining priorities. The government, of course, has not missed the 
opportunity to enhance its regulatory role in economic processes;  
 converge on the following guidelines:  
- to strengthen national brands; 
- to help enterprise clustering  
- to expand the manufacturing of high added-value products;  
- to move up the global value chain.  
The symbol of future industrial policy consists in large aircraft (with more than 100 
seats). The economic literature is full of issues related to this challenge which is 
expected to be won in 2016. Xinhua reported “Wu Guanghui, the vice general 
manager of COMAC and the chief designer of large airliners, said Airbus and 
Boeing begin with "A" and "B", while C919 begins with "C", which means China's 
large aircraft could also be strong on the international aviation market, and a new 
"ABC" structure will be formed.” 
21
China not only cherishes the dream of building its own plane but of reversing the 
relationship with those partners like Boeing and Aerbus for which it is now a 
supplier for parts and components. Among the parties concerned, the most widely 
heard statement is “we will build the whole aircraft and we will source part and 
  
                                                 
20 See, Wang Xiaolu, Fan Gang and Liu Peng, 2009; Liu Siwei, Du yan and Luo Huihua, 2009;  
21 Xinhua, 2 February 2010 8 
 
components globally, through international bidding”.
22
 
 The challenge of large aircraft 
is to become the archetype of a new design for global value chains which, according 
to the Chinese analysts, must liquidate their vertical character. In recent years, many 
scholars have expressed their concern about the rigid value chain which globally 
assigns the production domain to developing countries.  
Conclusions 
 
Last year, the international crisis was weakening Wen Jiabao’s project. In order to 
support the export-oriented sector, the government enacted some measures which 
conflicted with the rationale of restructuring: enterprise incentives risked avoiding 
the “natural selection” expected by the market. At a distance of one year, the 
evidence cited in this paper seems to attest that China is trying to emerge from the 
current  crisis,  resuming the plan for a comprehensive upgrade  of the economic 
system. As world citizens, we cannot but appreciate this exit strategy: the closure of 
polluting enterprises, the decrease in  the export of low-quality goods, and  the 
improvement of living and working conditions for millions of people employed in 
small  firms can mark the convergence between China and the most advanced 
economies in the world. The shift of Chinese industry as well as its role in the global 
value chain can, however, pose new challenges to the Italian manufacturing system. 
The decision to overturn the logic of the “race to the bottom” and to enhance product 
quality and enterprise  trustworthiness  means that  current  competitive advantages 
may be weakened by the Chinese manufacturing system moving up on the same 
ladder.  
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